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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
CaseNo.20000941-CA
vs.
Priority No. 2

JACK V. WILKINSON,
Defendant/Appellant.

JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
This Court has appellate jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to the provisions of Utah
Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(j).

ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain Wilkinson's conviction of

possession or use of methamphetamine. This Court will reverse a jury's verdict only if the
evidence, when viewed in a light most favorable to the jury's verdict, is so inconclusive or
so inherently improbable as to an element of the crime that reasonable minds must have
entertained a reasonable doubt as to that element. State v. Giles, 966 P.2d 872,876-77 (Utah
App. 1998). This issue was preserved in a Motion to Arrest Judgment (R. 212-217).

l

CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Utah Code Annotated § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i)
It is unlawful for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess or use a
controlled substance, unless it was obtained under a valid prescription or order, directly from
a practicioner while acting in the course of his professional practice, or as otherwise
authorized by this chapter.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case
Jack Wilkinson appeals from the judgment, sentence and commitment of the

Honorable Ray M. Harding, Sr. after he was convicted of three controlled substance
violations.
B.

Trial Court Proceedings and Disposition
Jack Wilkinson was charged by information filed in Fourth District Court on August

18, 1998 with the following criminal violations: possession of methamphetamine, a third
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Annotated § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i); possession of
marijuana, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Annotated § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i);
and possession of drug paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code
Annotated § 58-37a-5(a) (R. 2).
On May 26, 1999, a preliminary hearing was held before the Honorable Anthony
Schofield at which time Wilkinson was bound over for trial on the charges upon a finding
of probable cause and pleas of "not guilty" were entered upon arraignment (R. 64-65).
2

On November 18,1999, a jury trial was held with the Honorable Ray M. Harding, Sr.,
presiding (R. 90-91, ). Wilkinson was not present (R. 90-91, ). The jury convicted
Wilkinson on all three counts (R. 122-24).
After trial, Wilkinson, pro se, filed a motion to have Sid Unrau discharged as counsel
and to have new counsel appointed (R. 145). The trial court granted Wilkinson's motion (R.
152). James G. Clark was subsequently assigned to represent Wilkinson.
On February 9, 2000, and May 16,2000, Wilkinson filed motions to arrest judgment
(R. 156-64; 212-217). On June 22, 2000, Judge Harding, Sr., denied Wilkinson's second
motion finding that the evidence established a sufficient nexus between Wilkinson and the
drugs for the jury to find him guilty as charged (R. 228).
After a competency evaluation, Wilkinson was sentenced on September 25,2000, to
an indeterminate term in the Utah State Prison not to exceed five years (R. 240-42). On
October 24, 2000, Wilkinson, through current counsel, filed a Notice of Appeal in Fourth
District Court and this action commenced (R. 245).

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
A.

Testimony of Stephen Bullock
Stephen Bullock testified that he has known Jack Wilkinson for 15-20 years (R. 260

at 38). Bullock testified that in August of 1998 he was driving a work truck in which
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Wilkinson was a passenger (R. 260 at 39-40,42). Bullock and Wilkinson had been in Orem
at the home of Bullock's parents fixing his truck (R. 260 at 40).
As they were approaching American Fork, a traffic stop was made on the truck (R.
260 at 39). Bullock testified the officers believed that he was under the influence of drugs

\

and performed field sobriety tests (R. 260 at 40).
Bullock testified that there was a baggy with a small amount of methamphetamine,
a spoon, syringes, and marijuana in the truck (R. 260 at 41). According to Bullock, the baggy
with methamphetamine was found laying on the front seat R. 260 at 41). When Bullock was
asked by the State whether Wilkinson was aware of the methamphetamine, Bullock
responded "I don't know if I was even aware it was there. It was just a little bit left in a
corner. I think it was mine, and it had just been in the vehicle without me knowing it was
even there" R. 260 at 41). Bullock testified that he did not believe that Wilkinson brought the
methamphetamine into the truck (R. 260 at 43).
Bullock testified that the spoon and the syringes were located underneath the
passenger's seat (R. 260 at 41). Bullock testified that the spoon and the syringes were his
(R. 260 at 43). Bullock also indicated that the marijuana belonged to Wilkinson (R. 260 at
43).
Bullock testified that when the officers approached the vehicle, Wilkinson threw
"everything" into a bag under the seat in an effort to hide it "but when he got out [of the
truck] he kicked it out on the ground" (R. 260 at 44).
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Bullock denied any use of methamphetamine by himself or Wilkinson that day, but
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American Fork (R. 260 at 54-55). Shiverdecker spoke with Bullock, the driver, and had him
perform field sobriety tests which Bullock failed (R. 260 at 55).
Shiverdecker testified that he recognized Wilkinson, the passenger (R. 260 at 56).
Wilkinson was "slumped over, kind of leaning against the side of the car" (R. 260 at 56).
Shiverdecker testified that he shone his flashlight in the car and saw a syringe with
an orange cap (R. 260 at 56). Shiverdecker then placed Bullock in handcuffs and took him
out of the car (R. 260 at 57). Shiverdecker then approached the passenger side of the truck
to retrieve the syringe and asked Wilkinson to step out of the vehicle (R. 260 at 57). When
Wilkinson stepped out, he kicked a metal spoon, which had a burnt residue, and the syringe
out onto the ground (R. 260 at 57). Shivedecker testified that this could have happened
incidentally as Wilkinson exited the vehicle (R. 260 at 67). Wilkinson was placed in
handcuffs (R. 260 at 58). Shiverdecker then searched Wilkinson and found a syringe in his
pants pocket (R. 260 at 58).
Shiverdecker then searched the truck (R. 260 at 59). In the truck, Shiverdecker found
in the center of the passenger seat a "small baggy with a ziploc-type top" with a white
granular powder approximately 1 inch in size (R. 260 at 59, 69). Shiverdecker also found
a white paper sack under the seat that contained a number of syringes that were unused or
recapped, a small baggy of marijuana, and one syringe approximately "a quarter full of a
yellow substance, which appeared to be methamphetamine" (R. 260 at 59, 69).
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Shiverdecker testified that the spoon, the baggy and the marijuana were sent to the
crime lab (R. 260 at 66-67). The syringe with the yellow substance was not tested (R. 260
at 71). Shiverdecker never saw Wilkinson exercise control over the the items in the bag (R.
260 at 71).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Wilkinson asserts that his conviction of possession/use of methamphetamine should
be reversed for insufficient evidence because he was not observed actually using or
possessing the drug; nor was there a sufficient nexus between him and the drug found in
Bullock's truck to permit a factual inference, under a theory of constructive possession, that
he had the power and the intent to exercise control over the-drug.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH THAT
WILKINSON KNOWINGLY AND INTENTIONALLY
POSSESSED METHAMPHETAMINE
Wilkinson does not contest his convictions for possession of marijuana and possession
of drug paraphernalia—both class B misdemeanors. However, Wilkinson asserts that the
evidence produced at trial was insufficient to sustain the jury's verdict that he possessed or
used methamphetamine. This Court will reverse a jury's verdict only if the evidence, when
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viewed in a light most favorable to the jury's verdict, is so inconclusive or so inherently
improbable as to an element of the crime that reasonable minds must have entertained a
reasonable doubt as to that element. State v. Giles, 966 P.2d 872,876-77 (Utah App. 1998).
The chief element of possession or use of methamphetamine is that the defendant must
"knowingly and intentionally" possess or use the drug. There is no evidence showing that
Wilkinson had actual possession of methamphetamine-which in this case could only be
possession of the 1 inch zip-loc baggie found by officers on the seat of the truck, or possibly
the spoon which had a methamphetamine residue (although Wilkinson asserts that the spoon,
because it only had a burnt residue, is really only paraphernalia). Nor did law enforcement
personnel observe Wilkson actually use methamphetamine. Accordingly, for the jury to
convict Wilkinson of the crime for which he was charged it had to do so under a theory of
"constructive possession." See State v. Layman, 1999 UT 79111,985 P.2d 91 Inciting State
v. Fox, 709 P.2d 316, 319 (Utah 1985).
To prove that Wilkinson constructively possessed methamphetamine, it is "necessary
that 'there [be] a sufficient nexus between the accused and the drug to permit an inference
that the accused had both the power and the intent to exercise control over the drug.'"
Layman, 1999 UT 79113 (quoting Fox, 709 P.2d at 319). In other words, there "must be
facts which show that the accused intended to use the drugs as his own." Id.
The determination of constructive possession is "highly fact-sensitive". Layman,
1999 UT 79114. While Utah courts in State v. Fox and State v. Salas, 820 P.2d 1386 (Utah

App. 1991), set forth factors which aid the determination of constructive possession, these
factors "are factors that are particularly relevant to the specific context in which those cases
arose" and "are not universally pertinent factors" nor are they "legal elements of constructive
possession in any context." Layman, 1999 UT 79 at 114. The legal test for determining
constructive possession is whether "there was a sufficient nexus between the accused and the
drug to permit a factual inference that the defendant had the power and the intent to exercise
control over the drug.'" Layman, 1999 UT 79115 (citing Fox, 709 P.2d at 318). Moreover,
"a guilty verdict is not legally valid if it is based solely on inferences that give rise to only
remote or speculative possibilities of guilt." State v. Eberwein, 2001 UT App 71114, 21
P.3d 1139 (quoting both State v. Bryan, 1999 UT App 61 at 15, 975 P.2d 501; and State v.
Workman, 852 P.2d 981, 985 (Utah 1993).
In State v. Layman, the Utah Supreme Court was asked to determine whether Layman
exercised power and control over drugs that were found on the person of a passenger in his
vehicle. The facts indicate that Layman had probably used methamphetamine at some point
before the stop of his vehicle. 1999 UT 71 at 14,116. Layman had needle marks on his arm.
1999 UT 71 at 19. Layman's behavior was erratic after the stop: he appeared upset, fidgety
and had red, watery, eyes. 1999 UT App 71 at 16,116. Layman knew that the passenger had
drugs on her person as evidenced by his signal to her that she not consent to a search of the
pouch she was wearing. 1999 UT App 71 at 18. Nonetheless, the Utah Supreme Court
affirmed this Court's reversal of Layman's conviction on grounds of insufficient evidence:
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"The only fact tending to prove [Layman's] control over [the passenger] is that she looked
at him when the deputy requested to see the pouch and that [Layman] shook his head in a
negative fashion. This simply is not enough. All the other evidence in this case does nothing
to address this critical factual issue. Neither her presence in his vehicle, his erratic behavior
after the traffic stop, nor his use of drugs at some earlier time make up for this lack of
evidence." 1999 UT 71 at 116.
Wilkinson asserts that his case is really Layman in reverse. Instead of the inquiry
being on the driver's constructive possession of drugs that were under the control of the
passenger this case focuses on whether Wilkinson, the passenger, exercised control over
drugs which belonged to the driver, Stephen Bullock. The critical facts of this case, as
marshaled in Appellant's Statement of Facts, are as follows: Wilkinson was a passenger in
Bullock's truck (R. 260 at 39-40, 42). Bullock and Wilkinson had smoked marijuana
together earlier in the day and had used methamphetamine the previous day (R. 260 at 4142).
Bullock was stopped by a deputy with the Utah County Sheriff s office on suspension
of driving under the influence of drug or alcohol (R. 260 at 39). When the officer
approached the vehicle, Bullock testified that Wilkinson threw "everything" into a bag under
the seat (R. 260 at 44). Bullock failed field sobriety tests (R. 260 at 40, 55).
A syringe was observed on the floor of the truck by Deputy Shiverdecker (R. 260 at
56). When Wilkinson was told to exit the truck, he kicked a spoon and the syringe onto the
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street (R. 260 at 57). Deputy Shiverdecker admitted that Wilkinson's contact with the spoon
and the syringe could have been incidental. (R. 260 at 67).
A syringe was found in Wilkinson's pants pocket (R. 260 at 58). In addition,
Wilkinson was observed to have red eyes, dilated pupils and slurred speech (R. 260 at 50-51).
Wilkinson did not, however, smell of drugs (R. 260 at 50-51).
During a search of the truck, Deputy Shiverdecker found in the center of the truck's
bench seat a 1 inch "baggy with a ziploc-type top" with a white granular powder that later
tested positive for methamphetamine (R. 260 at 59, 66-67, 69). Shiverdecker also found a
white paper sack under the seat (towards the passenger side) that contained syringes and a
small baggy of marijuana (R. 260 at 59,69). At trial, Bullock testified that the spoon and the
syringes found in the truck belonged to him (R. 260 at 43). Bullock also testified that the
marijuana belonged to Wilkinson (R. 260 at 43). In relation to the linch baggy of
methamphetamine, Bullock testified: "I don't know if I was even aware it was there. It was
just a little bit left in a corner. I think it was mine, and had just been in the vehicle without
me knowing it was even there" (R. 260 at 41). Bullock also testified that he did not believe
that Wilkinson had brought the baggy into the truck (R. 260 at 43).
The only facts tending to prove Wilkinson's control over any methamphetamine are
that he (possibly incidentally) kicked the spoon with residue from the truck onto the street
as he was exiting the truck and that the 1 inch baggy was found on the truck seat where he
and Bullock had been sitting. Wilkinson asserts, that like Layman, "this simply is not
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enough" particularly when Bullock-the State's witness-testified that the spoon, and probably
the baggy, were his. 1999 UT 71 at|16. Wilkinson, similarly asserts that like Layman, "all
the other evidence in this case does nothing to address [the] critical issue" of whether he
constructively possessed the methamphetamine found in Bullock's truck. Finally, Wilkinson
asserts that like Layman, neither his presence in Bullock's truck, his blood shot eyes and
dilated pupils, his possession of paraphernalia and constructive possession of marijuana, nor
his earlier use of drugs do not "make up for this critical lack of evidence." 1999 UT 71 at
\\6. Accordingly, Wilkinson asks that this Court reverse his conviction for possession of
i

methamphetamine because there was not a sufficient nexus between him and the
methamphetamine found in Bullock's vehicle to permit a factual inference that he had the
power and the intent to exercise control over the drug(s).

'"

:

•

" •

" -

r

:

;

I

•

'

•

•

. ; • • - .

,

i

(

i

12
I

CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT
For the foregoing reasons, Wilkinson asks that this Court reverse his conviction of
possession of methamphetamine and that this matter be remanded to the Fourth District with
instructions that he is to be immediately released from the Utah State Prison.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this | ^ d a y of June, 2001.

Margaret^P. Lindsay
Counsel for Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I delivered two (2) true and correct copies of the foregoing Brief
Of Appellant to the Appeals Division, Utah Attorney General, 160 East 300 South, Sixth
Floor, P.O. Box 140854, Salt Lake City, UT 84114, this _/2fday of June, 2001.
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JAMES G. CLARK USB #3637
Attorney for Defendant
96 East 100 South
Provo, Utah 84606
Telephone: (801)375-1717
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

MOTION TO ARREST JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
Criminal No. 981405492

vs.

Judge: Ray M. Harding, Sr.

JACK VIRGIL WILKINSON,
Defendant.
/

COMES NOW Defendant, by and through counsel, James G. Clark, pursuant to Rule 23, Utah
Rules of Criminal Procedure, for good cause appearing and upon grounds more fully set forth in
Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Motion to Arrest Judgment, which supporting memorandum is
filed contemporaneously herewith, hereby moves the Court to arrest judgment pending the review and
resolution of these matters.

ILnt

DATED AND SIGNED this i £ _ day of May, 2000

2*±.

iMzL

JAMES<}. CLARK
Attorney for Defendant

I

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing, Motion to Arrest
Judgment, postage prepaid, addressed as follows:
Kay Bryson
Utah County Attorney's Office
100 E. Center, Suite #2100
Provo, Utah 84606
DATED AND SIGNED this J j j ^ day of May, 2000.
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JAMES G. CLARK USB #3637
Attorney for Defendant
96 East 100 South
Provo, Utah 84606
Telephone: (801)375-1717
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

DEFENDANT'S MEMORANDUM
TN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO
ARREST JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
vs.

Criminal No. 981405492

JACK VIRGIL WILKINSON,

Judge: Ray Harding, Sr.

Defendant.
/

COMES NOW Defendant, by and through counsel, James G. Clark, and hereby files
Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Motion to Arrest Judgment, and for good cause
appearing asserts the following.
On or about November 18, 1999, Defendant was tried in absentia and convicted of illegal
possession of methamphetamine, illegal possession of marijuana, and illegal possession of drug
paraphernalia. At the time of his arrest, Defendant was in actual possession of only drug
paraphernalia; he was charged with and convicted of possession of the controlled substances
under a theory of "constructive possession."
The elements of constructive possession as set forth in State v. Fox. 709 P.2d 316 (Utah
1985) require a showing that there be a "sufficient nexus between the accused and the drug to

\
\

permit an inference that the accused had both the power and the intent to exercise dominion and
control over the drug." Id. at 319; see also. State v. Layman. 953 P.2d 782, 792 (Utah Ct. App.
1998).
The court in Fox went on to elaborate on some of the factors that might support a charge
of constructive possession: (1) incriminating statements made by the accused, (2) incriminating
behavior of the accused, (3) presence of drugs in a specific area over which the accused had
control, such as a closet or drawer containing the accused's clothing or other personal effects, and
(4) presence of drug paraphernalia among the accused's personal effects or in a place over which
the accused has special control. Id. at 319-20.
In this case, the State attempted to establish a sufficient nexus through eliciting testimony
at trial that Defendant was situated nearest the drugs, that when he exited the back seat of the
vehicle he "kicked" the drugs out onto the ground, and that he was in possession of drug
paraphernalia. However, this showing of constructive possession was insufficient as a matter of
law and should not have been a question to be determined by the finder of fact.
Defendant never made any incriminating statements regarding knowledge, use, or
possession of the subject methamphetamine. In fact, Steve Bullock, the owner and operator of
the vehicle, plead guilty to a possession charge and admitted that the methamphetamine was his
and not Defendant's. Bullock testified that Defendant was asleep in the uaCrt. seat of the vehicle
and that when he was stopped by the patrol officer, Bullock threw the drugs into the back of the

- 2

car. Merely because Defendant was the person closest to the drugs and because they were found
on the ground once he exited the vehicle is insufficient to establish that the methamphetamine was
among his personal effects or in an area where he had specific control.
Lastly, while Defendant's possession of paraphernalia may be an indicia of constructive
possession, it cannot stand as the only evidence of Defendant's knowledge of the
methamphetamine and intent to exercise dominion and control over the same.
CONCLUSION
For these reasons and inasmuch as there was an insufficient nexus to establish
constructive possession of the methamphetamine, the Court should grant Defendant's Motion to
Arrest Judgment as the facts adduced do not support a public offense.
DATED AND SIGNED this j ^ T d a y of May, 2000.
-3K-

< S G. CLARK
ftorney for Defendant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I hand delivered a true and correct copy of the foregoing,
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Arrest Judgment, postage prepaid, addressed
follows:
KayBryson
Utah County Attorney's Office
100 E. Center, Suite #2100
Provo, Utah 84606
DATED AND SIGNED this ^ . day of May, 2000.
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FILED
fourth Judicial District Court
of Utah County, State of Utah
CARMA B. SMITH. Clerk

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT U fl lo6 Ak
Deoutv
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
^*~
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

RULING ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION
TO ARREST JUDGEMENT
CASE NO. 981405492

vs.

DATE: May 25,2000
JUDGE: RAY M. HARDING

JACK VIRGIL WILKINSON,
Defendant.

DEPUTY CLERK: Georgia Snyder
LAW CLERK: Gunda Jarvis

The Court has reviewed Defendant's Motion to Arrest Judgment and the facts of the case. Based on the
facts, a jury could easily have found actual, physical possession of the drugs, as well as constructive possession.
Numerous facts existed by which the jury could have determined that there was a sufficient nexus between the
Defendant and the drugs to find him guilty, as set forth in the jury instructions and precedent case State v. Fox, 709
P.2d 316 (Utah 1985). These facts include but are not limited to the following: Defendant was found with a syringe
at his feet in the vehicle; upon exiting the vehicle Defendant kicked the syringe and a spoon that tested positive for
methamphetamine to the ground; Defendant attempted to recover the kicked syringe; upon arrest of the Defendant
a used syringe was found in his pocket, which syringe Defendant admitted was his; and finally, the arresting officer
found track marks on the Defendant's arms, in regard to which the Defendant told the officer that he had shot up
earlier that day.
This Court holds that the facts presented to the jury were sufficient to show a strong nexus between the
Defendant and the drugs he was convicted of possessing, and the Defendant's Motion to Arrest Judgment is hereby
DENIED.

DATED this 2*4 day of May, 2000.
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Sherry Ragan, Deputy Utah County Attorney
James Clark, Counsel for Defendant
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